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Abstract 
Pension arrangements are in the process of changing in most OECD countries. These 
changes often include changes in normal pension ages. Several rationales are commonly 
given for changes in normal pension ages, including financial exigency and increases in 
life expectancy, but the public remains largely unconvinced. Here we use the 
methodology of the characteristics approach to the measurement of population ageing to 
derive a simple and transparent procedure, based on principles of equity that produces 
analytically-based normal pension ages. Forecasts of our normal pension ages are 
generally quite close to country plans. Episodic changes in normal pension ages could 
get more difficult as populations age. We recommend that policy-makers consider 
setting normal pension ages automatically, based on changes in mortality rates, using 
the simple, transparent, and equitable procedure provided here. 
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An Easily Understood and Intergenerationally Equitable Normal 
Pension Age 
Warren C. Sanderson 
Sergei Scherbov 
1 Introduction 
In public policy, age matters. A myriad of policies stipulate rights, obligations, benefits, 
and taxes on the basis of chronological age. Chronological age is a simple, easily 
understood characteristic of people and this makes it particularly useful in the 
specification of public policies. Nevertheless, several different factors now converge 
suggesting that, at least with respect to some policies, the treatment of age needs to be 
rethought, particularly in view of changes in longevity. On a theoretical level, 
Sanderson and Scherbov (2013) argue that ageing is a multidimensional phenomenon 
and that it needs to be studied on the basis of the characteristics of people. 
Chronological age is one characteristic of people, but for specific public policies it 
might not necessarily be the most relevant one, especially because it does not vary with 
longevity. On a general policy level, Shoven (2007) and Shoven and Goda (2010) show 
that the US public policies concerning the normal pension age, the age at eligibility for 
Medicare (health insurance for the elderly), and ages in tax-advantaged savings plans, 
would be quite different if those ages were indexed for changes in longevity. On the 
level of policy implementation, public pension programs are in the process of change in 
most OECD countries (OECD 2013). Those changes frequently involve changes in 
normal pension ages.  
In the provision of public pensions, fixed normal pension ages are already being 
replaced by variable ones. The conceptual basis for those variable normal pension ages, 
however, often remains unexplored and unarticulated. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a clearly defined and analytically-based model of normal pension ages. Our 
approach produces hypothetical normal pension ages that are simple to understand, 
transparent, intergenerationally equitable, and vary with changing mortality conditions. 
Model-based normal pension ages are useful because they have known properties. A 
comparison of country policies with model-based normal pension ages can be useful in 
assessing those country policies.  
Among wealthier countries in recent years one topic has been particularly 
contentious – changes in pension ages. Pension age changes have been challenged for a 
number of reasons. Important among these is the evident unfairness of the changes. 
Governments sometimes make the argument that changes in normal pension ages are 
needed because pensions are expensive and the government does not have the money to 
pay them. This argument is certainly unpersuasive. If the government does not have 
enough money, it can get it in any number of ways. It can reduce subsidies to various 
firms and sectors of the economy. It can produce its services more efficiently. It can 
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stop performing services that have little or no value or are targeted to those in society 
who are already well-off. It can also raise the general level of taxes. The argument that 
pensions are expensive and therefore pension ages should be increased is a bit like 
making the argument that education is expensive and therefore there should be fewer 
schools. If governments need money, they should produce a balanced plan to raise 
some. Certainly, pension age changes can be part of those reforms, but, if the only 
problem is a shortage of money, it is unfair to argue that older people should have their 
benefits reduced, while farmers, among others, should not.  
Changes in national pension ages are also problematic because of intercohort 
inequalities. Changes in national pension age policies are usually written so that people 
born in one year can get a full pension at, say, 65, while people born a year later can 
only get a pension when they are older. If the only problem is a shortage of money and 
the government was devising a fair plan to raise that money, why should a one day 
difference in birthdays translate into different levels of pension receipt? 
Unanticipated changes in normal pension ages are inequitable. Changes in the 
normal pension age do not change the incomes of current pensioners. Young people 
have time to change their labor force and saving behavior to adjust to the changes. 
People near the previous normal pension age suffer because they have made plans based 
on that age. Episodic changes in normal pension ages during periods of economic duress 
are certainly a poor approach to the formulation of pension age policy. In order for 
people to understand, accept, and voluntarily adjust to changes in national pension ages, 
two criteria must be met. First, the rationale for pension age policy must be compelling, 
simple and transparent. Second, the resulting policies must be clearly 
intergenerationally equitable. Currently, in most high income countries, neither criteria 
is met. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that pension age changes are so 
contentious.  
The aims of this paper are: (1) to specify an analytically-based national pension 
age policy that meets both of those criteria, (2) to compute the resulting hypothetical 
normal pension ages for selected European countries, and (3) to assess the relationship 
between forecasts of the hypothetical normal pension ages that we compute and the 
plans that governments have for their normal pension ages.  
The paper has 7 sections. In Section 2, we discuss the characteristics approach to 
the measurement of population ageing (Sanderson & Scherbov 2013). This 
methodology can be used to produce hypothetical ages based on the characteristics of 
people. The characteristics approach provides the basis for understanding how those 
characteristic-based ages could usefully be applied in public policies. In Section 3, we 
discuss the contributions of Shoven and Goda (2010). Shoven and Goda have provided 
the first detailed discussion of the effects of incorporating changes in mortality rates on 
the ages built into various US government policies, including the normal pension age. In 
Section 4, we discuss the three key features of a desirable normal pension age policy, 
simplicity, transparency, and intergenerational equity. In that Section, we also present a 
highly simplified model of a pension system that points to a new way of determining 
normal pension ages. Among other things, we show in that Section that increasing 
normal pension ages on the basis of increases in life expectancies at some fixed 
chronological age does not meet equity criteria. In Section 5, we provide examples of 
the new analytically-based normal pension ages. In Section 6, we compare our pension 
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ages to those already planned for the future and discuss what could be done to improve 
welfare if planned pension ages rise too fast. We provide a concluding discussion in 
Section 7. 
2 The Characteristics Approach to the Measurement of 
Population Ageing 
The characteristics approach to the study of population ageing, developed by Sanderson 
and Scherbov (2013; 2005; 2010; 2008; 2007b), starts from the assumption that ageing 
is a multidimensional phenomenon. Chronological age is one characteristic of people, 
but, depending on exactly what is studied, it might not be the most interesting or 
informative one. Because ageing is multidimensional, a framework is needed that can 
consistently integrate a variety of characteristics. The fundamental building block of the 
characteristics approach is a characteristic schedule. A characteristic schedule relates 
chronological age to the average level of the characteristic in the population.  
In mathematical notation, we express the characteristic schedule as ( )aCk r= , 
where k is the level of the characteristic observed at age a in population r. This 
relationship can be written in the reverse way, where for any level of the characteristic 
we can find the associated age. This can be expressed by the equation ( )kCa r 1−= .  
We use the term “alpha age” to refer to a characteristic-based age. Alpha ages, in 
general, are derived from the equation ( )( )aCC rs 1−=a , where r and s refer to two 
different characteristic schedules. For example, r and s can refer to the characteristic 
schedules of a country in different years. a  is the age in characteristic schedule s where 
people have the same characteristic level as they have at age a in schedule r.  
We illustrate how alpha ages are computed in Table 1. The table shows two 
characteristic schedules, one labeled r and the other labeled s. The two characteristic 
schedules can refer to, among other things, two countries, two years, two genders, two 
population subgroups, or some combination of these. In the characteristic schedule r, 
chronological age is shown in the left column and he corresponding characteristic level 
in the right column. In characteristic schedule s, the order is reversed and we have put 
the characteristic level on the left and the chronological age on the right. Which one of 
the two is put on the right or left is immaterial.  
Let us begin with the term ( )aCr . In Table 1, ( ) 4362 =rC . In other words, 
people of age 62 in the characteristic schedule r, have the characteristic level 43. The 
second step in the computation of alpha age is to find the age in characteristic schedule s 
where people have the characteristic level 43. In mathematical notation this is just ( )431−sC . We can see from Table 1 that people in characteristic schedule s who have the 
characteristic level of 43 are 64 years old ( ( )431−sC =64). So we say that the alpha age of 
people 62 years old in r is 64, when s is used as a standard of comparison.  
One crucial question in the study of normal pension ages is what characteristic 
to use. This question was recently raised in Shoven and Goda (2010), so we turn to their 
work next.  
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Table 1. Hypothetical Example of the Computation of an Alpha-Age. 
Characteristic Schedule r Characteristic Schedule s 
Chronological Age Characteristic Level Characteristic Level Chronological Age 
60 50 48 62 
61 47 46 63 
62 43 43 64 
63 38 41 65 
64 32 35 66 
 
3 The Work of Shoven and Goda 
Shoven and Goda (2010), building on the work of Shoven (2007), computed what we 
call alpha ages associated with three US government policies, Social Security (old age 
pension program), Medicare (health insurance for the elderly), and Individual 
Retirement Accounts (tax-advantaged saving plans for retirement). They calculated 
alpha ages corresponding to 7 different chronological ages used in those programs, 
including the normal pension age. They used 4 different characteristics, remaining life 
expectancy, equivalent mortality risk, the ratio of remaining life expectancy to life 
expectancy at birth, and the ratio of remaining life expectancy to life expectancy at age 
20.  
 
Table 2. Alpha Normal Pension Ages in 2004. 
Characteristic Male Female Total 
Remaining Life 
Expectancy 
73.0 71.0 73.0 
Equivalent Mortality 
Risk 
75.0 71.0 74.0 
Ratio of Remaining 
Life Expectancy to Life 
Expectancy at Birth 
83.0 81.9 81.8 
Ratio of Remaining 
Life Expectancy to Life 
Expectancy at 20 
76.1 74.8 76.0 
Note: Alpha ages for the characteristics remaining life expectancy and equivalent 
mortality risk are rounded by Shoven and Goda. Source: Shoven and Goda (2010), 
Table 4.1, p. 152. 
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Table 2 reproduces the portion of their findings for alpha normal pension ages 
assuming that the characteristic remains fixed at the level for 65 year olds observed in 
1935, the year in which the Social Security (national pension) system was introduced. 
65 was the normal pension age in the US from 1935 to 2002. 
The alpha normal pension age of 71.0 for women using the characteristic 
“remaining life expectancy” means that women in 2004 who had the same remaining 
life expectancy as 65 year old women in 1935 were around 71 years old. Another alpha 
normal pension age uses the characteristic of the ratio of remaining life expectancy to 
life expectancy at 20. To compute this alpha age, the ratio of the remaining life 
expectancy of women 65 years old in 1935 to the remaining life expectancy of 20 year 
old women in that year has to be calculated. The second step is to find the age in 2004 
where the ratio of remaining life expectancy to life expectancy at age 20 was the same 
as in was for 65 year old women in 1935. That age was 74.8. 
In mathematical notation, the alpha normal pension ages in Table 2 come from 
the expression ( )( )65193512004 CC−=a . 
While it is natural for economic magnitudes to be adjusted for differences in 
price levels over time and from place to place, many public policies are based on 
chronological ages that are not adjusted for changes in longevity. Shoven and Goda 
show clearly that adjusting the chronological ages built into a number of US 
government policies for longevity changes would have a substantial impact. Their goal 
was not to decide which of the 4 characteristics that they studied would be best used for 
adjusting legislated ages in particular instances. Our goal, however, is to decide which 
characteristic is the best for calculating alpha normal pension ages. In order to do this, 
we must first be clear about exactly what we want our alpha normal pension ages to 
accomplish. 
4 Ex-Ante Equitable Normal Pension Ages 
Our goal in this Section is to determine simple, transparent, and equitable alpha normal 
pension ages. An alpha normal pension age is different from a normal pension age 
based on a fixed chronological age. Alpha normal pension ages vary with differing 
mortality conditions. Thus, we are not seeking a single alpha normal pension age. 
Rather our goal is to determine the procedure through which mortality conditions could 
be used in computing normal pension ages with known desirable features. Different 
mortality conditions will, in general, produce different alpha normal pension ages. 
The features that we want in our alpha normal pension age are: (1) simplicity, 
(2) transparency, and (3) equity. Of the three, the last requires the most explanation. 
Here we are not talking about social equity, i.e. equity among population subgroups. For 
the population as a whole two types of equity can be distinguished, ex-ante equity and 
ex-post equity. This is similar to the distinction between process equality and outcome 
equality. For people to accept a method for determining normal pension ages, it must be 
clear that it is ex-ante equitable. Of course, like any insurance plan, the method will not 
result in ex-post equality. Some people will die before reaching any plausible normal 
pension age and therefore could have paid into the pension system and gotten nothing in 
return.   
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In order to find a mechanism determining alpha normal pension ages with 
desirable properties, we will consider a grossly simplified pension system. The 
enormous simplifications are designed to help us see the essence of the situation more 
clearly. Our simplified representation begins with a cohort starting at age 20. The adult 
lifecycle is divided into two phases, a pre-pension phase and a pension phase.  
Ex ante equality requires that members of each cohort receive as much money in 
pension benefits as they contribute to the pension system. Systems in which cohorts 
receive much more or much less than they put in are not ex ante equitable. If the 
members of one cohort receive much more than they contribute to the system, then 
people in other cohorts have to pay for this. If the members of one cohort pay into the 
pension system more than they receive in benefits, people in other cohorts are the 
beneficiaries. 
We express the idea that members of each cohort must receive as much money 
in pension benefits as they contribute to the pension system as: 
vpuy ⋅=⋅⋅τ ,           (1) 
where u is the number of person-years lived by members of the cohort in the pre-
pension phase, τ  is the pension tax rate on income, y is average income during the pre-
pension years, v is the number of person-years lived by members of the cohort in the 
pension phase, and p is the average annual pension receipt. The term p can be expressed 
as 
v
P
, where P is the total amount paid out to pensioners in the cohort. Therefore, p is 
just the average pension receipt per pensioner. The term y can be expressed as 
u
Y
, 
where Y is the total income of all people in the pre-pension ages. Therefore, y is just the 
average income of people in the pre-pension ages. 
The equation is written without a discount rate. There are several reasons for 
doing this. First, payments into a pension fund are like investments in a risk-free 
insurance policy that pays off in perfectly inflation adjusted money. The real rate of 
interest on the safest government bonds has been close to zero for decades, so using 
zero discount rates is not out of line with what we observe. Second, with discounting, 
we would have to introduce details of the time profile of pension contributions and 
receipts that go far beyond what could be done in this paper and would distract from the 
central point here. Third, national pension systems have an important social component. 
They are designed, in part, to help those who have had bad luck or made bad economic 
decisions in their youth. When this social component is considered, the motivation for 
discounting becomes less clear.  
The most important reason for not discounting has to do with simplicity. 
Equation (1) says that each cohort gets as much out of the pension system as they put 
into it. People can understand this and could support a pension system based on it.  
There is a second dimension of equality that has to be taken into account here. 
People would not consider a pension system equitable if pensioners received more 
money every year than the incomes of those contributing, net of their pension 
contributions. Countries make a social choice of the level of pension income relative to 
the after-(pension)-tax income of pre-pensioners. We express this using the equation 
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( )τβ −⋅⋅= 1yp ,         (2) 
where p is the average pension, y is the average income of people in the pre-pension 
period, τ  is the pension tax rate, and β is the ratio of annual pension income to the 
income of people in the pre-pension period after adjustment for pension contributions. β  is the relative generosity of pension benefits. If society makes a decision to reward 
one cohort by giving it a high β  and penalizes another with a low β , this is clearly not 
equitable. 
Equations (1) and (2) can be combined to yield an expression for the ratio of the 
number of person-years lived in the pre-pension phase to the number of person-years 
lived in the pension phase. 
 −⋅= 11τβvu .         (3) 
Equation (3) is simple, but very powerful. It combines two criteria for ex ante 
equity. The first is that each cohort must receive in pension benefits what it contributes 
to the pension system. The second is that the balance between pension receipts and the 
income people have in their pre-pension years net of their pension contributions should 
be the same across cohorts. In this way pensioners are not allowed to grow ever richer at 
the expense of those who support them or increasingly impoverished for the benefit of 
younger generations.  
A useful feature of our hypothetical pension system is that the pension 
contribution rate, τ , is the same across cohorts. In practice, the pension contribution 
rate is usually fixed across cohorts as a matter of practicality. Having different pension 
contribution rates for different cohorts in the same year would mean that the pension 
contribution rates would have to differ by age. People would only agree to pay different 
pension contribution tax rates if governments could credibly commit to providing 
greater benefits to those who pay the higher rates, which is rarely the case.  
In equation (3) if the generosity of the pension system, β , and the pension 
contribution rate, τ , are fixed, the ratio of u to v is fixed, independent of the level of 
income. A fixed ratio of u to v is easy to explain. If the ratio of u to v is fixed, then the 
ratio 
vu
v+  is also fixed. The latter ratio essentially says that for each cohort, the 
number of years people receive a pension is a fixed proportion of all the years they live 
from age 20 onward. A pension system based on this fixed ratio is equitable because the 
ratio is the same for all cohorts regardless of the mortality conditions that they face.  
In the computation of alpha normal pension ages, we do not need to investigate 
using a variety of different characteristics. Equation (3) requires that we use a particular 
characteristic to set alpha normal pension ages, the ratio of the number of person-years 
lived in the pre-pension period to the number of person-years lived in the pension 
period.  
The characteristic, 
v
u
, is simple to compute using the xT  column of the life 
table. aTTu −= 20  and aTv = , where a is the alpha normal pension age. In terms of life 
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table notation, then 120 −= aTTvu , and this equation can easily be solved for the alpha 
normal pension age.   
In addition to being simple to understand, this characteristic has the advantage of 
being transparent. Life tables are freely available to anyone. Also, because the 
characteristic on which alpha normal pension ages are based is public and not 
computed, manipulated, or contested by various factions, it is a strong foundation 
around which a consensus can be developed.  
In Table 3, we show 
20
65
T
T for men and women in selected countries in 2013. It is 
the inverse of the ratio in the equation for 
v
u
. We show it in the table because it is easier 
to interpret. 
20
65
T
T
 is the fraction of all person-years lived from age 20 onward that are 
also lived at ages 65+. The median proportion of adult person-years lived at age 65+ is 
0.2635 for men and 0.3065 for women. All men in the Western European countries in 
the Table have values above the median and all men in Eastern European countries have 
values below the median. The same is true for women, except for Ireland, where the 
value for women is 0.306, just marginally below the median. If the normal pension age 
were 65, then 
20
65
T
T
 is the fraction of all adult-person years spent in pension. The low 
20
65
T
T
 ratios in Eastern Europeans countries indicate that if the normal pension age were 
65, Eastern Europeans would spend a smaller fraction of their adult person-years with a 
pension than would Western Europeans. If people in the two groups of countries were to 
have the same ratio of adult person-years in pension, then the normal pension ages 
would have to be lower in Eastern Europe. 
The data underlying Table 3 in this Section and Tables 4 and 5 in the next 
Section were created as part of the preparation of the European Demographic Datasheet 
(2014). 
Equation (3) shows that alpha normal pension ages should be set so that 
20T
Ta
 is 
fixed. This is close to Shoven and Goda’s characteristic of a fixed proportion of life 
expectancy at age 20, but it is not the same. Shoven and Goda’s characteristic 
⋅= aaa llTTee 202020 .  
Because life expectancies are increasing and life expectancy is the most well-
known and well-understood life table function, it is tempting to use life expectancy 
changes to change normal pension ages, as Shoven and Goda have done. Sweden, Italy, 
Poland, and Norway have adopted a notional defined contribution pension system where 
pension contributions are cumulated in a notional account (OECD 2011). At retirement 
age, the total is turned into an annuity based on life expectancy. This system fails the 
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principle of equity that states that the total amount of money contributed by a cohort to 
the pension system should be returned to the cohort in terms of pension benefits. 
Because each person of pension age gets an actuarially fair return on his contributions, 
the system takes from each cohort the pension contributions of those who do not survive 
to the pension age. This money might be returned to each cohort or perhaps it is used to 
fund the pensions of other cohorts.  
Another way of using life expectancy as a basis of changing normal pension age 
is to increase normal pension ages according to some fraction of the increase in life 
expectancy at a specific age. There is no guarantee that this procedure would be 
equitable either. Further, because it is not based on a clear definition of equity, 
questions would always arise as to what fraction of the increase in life expectancy to use 
and at what age to measure it. 
Alpha normal pension age is a simple, transparent, and equitable normal pension 
age. It is based on clear assumptions about the features of an equitable pension age. In 
the next Section, we present those ages for a selected set of European countries.  
 
Table 3. 
20
65
T
T for men and women in selected countries in 2013. 
 
Males Females 
Bulgaria 0.194 0.257 
France 0.276 0.333 
Georgia 0.198 0.264 
Germany 0.264 0.307 
Greece 0.263 0.307 
Ireland 0.267 0.306 
Italy 0.277 0.325 
Latvia 0.182 0.269 
Russian Federation 0.156 0.247 
Serbia 0.202 0.249 
Slovakia 0.207 0.274 
Spain 0.271 0.325 
Sweden 0.275 0.309 
United Kingdom 0.271 0.307 
Note: 
20
65
T
T
 is the ratio of all person-years lived from age 20 onwards that are also lived 
after age 65. Source: Authors calculations based on life tables prepared for the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014). 
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5 Temporal Paths of Equitable Normal Pension Ages 
In Table 4, we show alpha normal pension ages based on the formula ( )( )651 rs CC −=a , 
where ( ) 120 −=
aT
T
aC , r refers to a specific combination of country, gender, and the year 
2013, and s refers characteristic schedule of various years of interest for that country 
and gender. Computed in this way, all alpha normal pension ages in 2013 are assumed 
to be 65.  
Table 4 shows that if 65 is the appropriate normal pension age in 2013, then for 
most countries, in order to keep the proportion of adult person-years in pension 
constant, the normal pension age should increase to between 69 and 70 by 2050. The 
similarity in the normal pension ages across countries is more interesting than it first 
appears. The ratio of adult person years spent at age 65 and beyond to all adult person-
years varies across countries in 2013. For men, it was lowest in the Russian Federation, 
where it was 0.156 and highest in Italy, where it was 0.277. The lowest level for women 
was also in the Russian Federation, where it was 0.247. The highest level for women 
was in France, where one-third of all adult person-years was spent at age 65 or beyond. 
Nearly constant alpha pension ages across countries over time indicates that the 
forecasts in the European Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 
2014) envision that the countries with low ratios continue to have low ratios and those 
with high ratios continue to have high ratios. Convergence in the proportion of person-
years spent at more advanced ages to all adult person-years is not envisaged. 
Table 5 shows the alpha pension ages keeping constant the person-years ratio for 
Germany in 2013. An interesting policy question is what normal pension ages should be 
if European countries moved toward a common policy with respect to those pension 
ages. Table 5 presents a concrete example of that policy based on alpha normal pension 
ages. The result would be very similar if we took any Western European country in 
2013 as the standard. For German women and men the alpha pension age increases to 
almost 70 by 2050. Alpha pension ages are almost identical for Greece as they are for 
Germany. France has marginally higher alpha pension ages than the Germans and 
Greeks. Russians and the people in Eastern European countries have considerably lower 
alpha normal pension ages. The alpha normal pension age for Russian men in 2013 is 
only 57.30. Russian women have an alpha pension age of 60.99 in 2013, over 3 years 
higher than that of men. By 2050, the gap between the alpha pension ages of Russian 
men and women is forecasted to shrink a bit, but the alpha pension age for Russian men 
is still only 62.41 in that year.  
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Table 4a. Alpha normal pension ages for women in selected European countries, 2013, 
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
Women,  
 
   Country 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Bulgaria 65.00 65.42 66.63 67.83 69.13 
France 65.00 65.65 66.88 68.03 69.28 
Georgia 65.00 65.37 66.55 67.77 69.04 
Germany 65.00 65.82 67.09 68.34 69.62 
Greece 65.00 65.97 67.32 68.59 69.88 
Ireland 65.00 65.68 66.86 68.07 69.31 
Italy 65.00 65.65 66.89 68.13 69.37 
Latvia 65.00 65.68 66.88 68.13 69.36 
Russian Federation 65.00 65.37 66.46 67.50 68.58 
Serbia 65.00 65.63 66.90 68.18 69.49 
Slovakia 65.00 65.78 67.04 68.30 69.61 
Spain 65.00 65.41 66.63 67.85 69.09 
Sweden 65.00 65.70 66.90 68.14 69.40 
United Kingdom 65.00 65.68 66.97 68.19 69.41 
Note: Alpha normal pension ages are based on the ratio 
65
20
T
T
 observed in the country in 
2013. Source: Authors’ Computations based on data compiled for the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014). 
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Table 4b. Alpha normal pension ages for men in selected European countries, 2013, 
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
Men,  
 
   Country 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Bulgaria 65.00 65.60 66.96 68.31 69.69 
France 65.00 66.09 67.52 68.74 70.02 
Georgia 65.00 66.17 67.54 68.89 70.27 
Germany 65.00 66.00 67.45 68.70 69.99 
Greece 65.00 66.19 67.58 68.84 70.15 
Ireland 65.00 65.56 66.71 67.89 69.10 
Italy 65.00 65.57 66.84 68.14 69.40 
Latvia 65.00 66.17 67.80 69.39 70.83 
Russian Federation 65.00 65.69 67.33 68.81 70.22 
Serbia 65.00 65.97 67.27 68.54 69.85 
Slovakia 65.00 65.92 67.46 68.85 70.26 
Spain 65.00 65.61 67.05 68.35 69.64 
Sweden 65.00 65.66 66.87 68.07 69.34 
United Kingdom 65.00 65.58 66.82 68.00 69.23 
Note: Alpha normal pension ages are based on the ratio 
65
20
T
T
 observed in the country in 
2013. Source: Authors’ Computations based on data compiled for the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014). 
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Table 5a. Alpha normal pension ages for women in selected European countries, 2013, 
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
Women,  
        
Country 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Bulgaria 61.70 62.09 63.26 64.43 65.67 
France 66.90 67.57 68.82 70.01 71.29 
Georgia 62.17 62.53 63.67 64.85 66.06 
Germany 65.00 65.82 67.09 68.34 69.62 
Greece 64.98 65.95 67.30 68.57 69.86 
Ireland 64.94 65.62 66.80 68.00 69.24 
Italy 66.28 66.93 68.20 69.47 70.73 
Latvia 62.49 63.15 64.31 65.52 66.72 
Russian Federation 60.99 61.34 62.41 63.41 64.46 
Serbia 61.21 61.81 63.02 64.25 65.50 
Slovakia 62.81 63.58 64.81 66.03 67.29 
Spain 66.29 66.70 67.93 69.18 70.45 
Sweden 65.13 65.83 67.03 68.27 69.54 
United Kingdom 64.99 65.67 66.96 68.18 69.40 
Note: Alpha normal pension ages are based on the ratio 
65
20
T
T
 observed in Germany in 
2013. Source: Authors’ Computations based on data compiled for the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014). 
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Table 5b. Alpha normal pension ages for men in selected European countries, 2013, 
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 
Men, 
 
   Country 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Bulgaria 60.25 60.82 62.14 63.44 64.78 
France 65.83 66.92 68.36 69.59 70.87 
Georgia 60.52 61.64 62.97 64.28 65.61 
Germany 65.00 66.00 67.45 68.70 69.99 
Greece 64.91 66.09 67.48 68.74 70.05 
Ireland 65.18 65.73 66.88 68.07 69.29 
Italy 65.89 66.46 67.74 69.05 70.33 
Latvia 59.34 60.46 62.03 63.57 64.97 
Russian Federation 57.30 57.96 59.56 61.00 62.41 
Serbia 60.86 61.80 63.07 64.31 65.59 
Slovakia 61.15 62.04 63.53 64.89 66.27 
Spain 65.52 66.12 67.57 68.87 70.17 
Sweden 65.75 66.41 67.63 68.85 70.11 
United Kingdom 65.49 66.06 67.32 68.50 69.74 
Note: Alpha normal pension ages are based on the ratio 
65
20
T
T
 observed in Germany in 
2013. Source: Authors’ Computations based on data compiled for the European 
Demographic Data Sheet (Vienna Institute of Demography 2014). 
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6 Comparison of Increases in Alpha Normal Pension Ages to 
Planned Changes 
In this section, we compare changes in alpha pension ages with current plans to change 
normal pension ages using Germany in 2013 as a standard (characteristic schedule s). 
An important policy question is whether countries should strive to have roughly the 
same normal pension ages in the future. Our approach suggests that they should not try 
to have similar normal pension ages based on chronological age, but rather that they 
could try to have similar alpha normal pension ages. Having similar alpha normal 
pension ages are preferable because they take mortality differences into account. We 
use Germany in 2013 as our standard to help us look at what converged alpha normal 
pension ages could look like in the future. Had we used any other Western European 
country in 2013 as a standard the results would be similar. In Table 5, the alpha pension 
ages for Germany are a bit over 67 years old for both men and women in 2030. 
Currently, the normal pension age in Germany is scheduled to increase to 67 by 2029. 
The alpha normal pension ages and the planned normal pension age match almost 
exactly. In Spain, the normal pension age is scheduled to rise to 67 in 2027. The alpha 
pension ages for women and men in 2030 are 67.93 and 67.57 respectively. Again the 
match between the alpha pension ages and the legislated ones is close. Italian pension 
reforms call for the normal pension ages of men and women to increase to 66 in 2018. 
The alpha pension ages for women and men in 2020 are 66.93 and 66.46 respectively. 
Again the match is close. After 2018, there will be an automatic linkage between the 
changes in the normal pension age and increases in life expectancy. This is not 
consistent with the equity criteria that we discussed above.  
Some countries have legislated increases in normal pension ages that are faster 
than those suggested by the alpha normal pension ages. In the UK, normal pension ages 
are scheduled to rise to 67 by 2026. The alpha pension age for women in 2030 is 66.98 
and it is 67.32 for men. The rise in the UK normal pension age is slightly faster than the 
rise in alpha pension ages. In Ireland, the legislated increase in normal pension age is 
much faster than the increase in alpha pension ages. The normal pension age is 
scheduled to increase to 68 in 2028 in Ireland. In 2030, the alpha normal pension ages 
are 66.88 for men and 66.80 for women. Greece has already increased its normal 
pension age to 67, while its alpha pension age is still around 65. France is an interesting 
example of a country with a normal pension age much below its alpha normal pension 
age. In 2050, France is the country in Table 5 with the highest alpha normal pension 
ages. If its normal pension age remains at 62, France at that time will be massively out 
of step with much of Western Europe.  
Normal pension ages tend to be lower in Eastern European countries, as alpha 
normal pension ages suggest they should be. Typically, the pension ages for men are 
higher than for women, which is the opposite of what the alpha normal pension ages 
suggest they should be. In the Russian Federation, for example, the normal pension age 
is currently 60 for men and 55 for women. The alpha normal pension ages are 57.30 for 
men and 60.99 for women. Russian normal pension ages are now very roughly 
consistent with those in Western Europe, taking life expectancy differences into 
account. 
Alpha normal pension ages are a simple analytic tool for discussing the 
evolution of normal pension ages. In this section, we showed that they are close enough 
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to the legislated paths to make interesting comparisons. Alpha normal pension ages are 
easy to understand, easy to compute, and provide informative comparisons to legislated 
values. 
7 Concluding Discussion 
In Table 5, alpha normal pension ages rise to 70 for many countries by 2050. Alpha 
normal pension ages are designed to be fair, but it is sometimes argued that substantial 
increases in normal pension ages make the pension system more unfair. People in 
physically hazardous or especially arduous occupations might not be physically capable 
of working to age 70. It is certainly true that some people may not be able to work to 
age 70, but this does not automatically mean that normal pension ages should not be 
raised. Alpha pension ages are fair pension ages. Keeping pension ages fixed is unfair. 
Alpha pension ages rise over time because of increases in the remaining life 
expectancy of older people and higher survivorship to older ages. In the past increased 
life expectancy has been associated with better health at older ages and better cognitive 
functioning (Vaupel 2010; Christensen et al. 2009; Baudisch & Vaupel 2012; Weber et 
al. 2014; Bordone et al. 2014). When people picture whether people can or cannot work 
up to age 70, they naturally picture today’s 70 year olds. But tomorrow’s 70 year olds 
will be different. They will be healthier, better educated, and it is likely that they would 
more attracted to market work than today’s 70 year olds (Scherbov, Sanderson, KC, et 
al. 2014).   
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to ignore the distributional effects of 
increasing normal pension ages. In Economics, there is a rule of thumb that states that 
policy-makers should have at least policy available to them for every target that they 
wish to attain. The single policy, changes in normal pension ages, should not be treated 
as being capable of simultaneously hitting the two policy targets. This is why in many 
countries, pension reforms that increased normal pension ages also provided additional 
support to people who had difficulties continuing to work at older ages (OECD 2014).  
In some cases, such as that of Ireland, planned increases normal pension ages are 
considerably faster than those in alpha normal pension ages.  Reducing the speed of the 
planned increases, in these cases, could make the pension system more 
intergenerationally equitable. It would, however, increase government expenditures. It 
could be possible for governments to add to their revenues by reducing labor market 
distortions which discourage people who would otherwise wish to work. In (Scherbov, 
Sanderson & Mamolo 2014) we showed that, in many European countries, a one to two 
percentage point increase in the average labor force participation rates resulting from a 
decrease in labor market distortions could compensate for a one year decrease in the 
normal pension age in terms of the burden of workers supporting those not in the labor 
force. A joint policy change, simultaneously reducing labor market distortions and 
reducing the speed of increase in the normal pension age, could result in a more 
equitable pension system without a loss of revenue to the government. It would be a 
win-win policy because labor markets would be less distorted and the pension system 
would be more equitable.  
Two different approaches to changing normal pension ages has emerged in 
Europe. One is to set targets for normal pension ages, often a decade or more in the 
future. After a while a new set of political negotiations is necessary to produce new 
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targets. This episodic policy making has an important problem. As countries age, it is 
likely to become ever more difficult politically to make the needed reforms of normal 
pension ages. In Sanderson and Scherbov (2007a), we showed that by 2050 around 39 
percent of Germany’s voting age population would be 65+ years old. 
The alternative approach increases normal pension ages continuously as life 
expectancy increases. This approach is currently implemented in Sweden and will be 
implemented in Italy from 2018 onward. This form of demographic indexation is a step 
in the right direction, but indexation based on the xT  column of the life table rather than 
the xe  column would be preferable. Alpha pension ages provide a helpful guide to 
continuous modification of pension ages because those ages are based on an easily 
understood principle that is readily seen as fair. Policy-makers should consider 
replacing episodic changes in normal pension ages with continuous ones based on alpha 
normal pension ages. 
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